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Abstract 
Security is an essential requirement in mobile ad hoc 
networks to provide protected communication between 
mobile nodes. Due to unique characteristics of MANETS, 
it creates a number of consequential challenges to its 
security design. To overcome the challenges, there is a 
need to build a multifence security solution that achieves 
both broad protection and desirable network performance. 
MANETs are vulnerable to various attacks, blackhole, is 
one of the possible attacks. Black hole is a type of routing 
attack where a malicious node advertise itself as having 
the shortest path to all nodes in the environment by 
sending fake route reply. By doing this, the malicious node 
can deprive the traffic from the source node. It can be used 
as a denial-of-service attack where it can drop the packets 
later. In this paper, we proposed a DPRAODV (Detection, 
Prevention and Reactive AODV) to prevent security 
threats of blackhole by notifying other nodes in the 
network of the incident. The simulation results in ns2 (ver-
2.33) demonstrate that our protocol not only prevents 
blackhole attack but consequently improves the overall 
performance of (normal) AODV in presence of black hole 
attack. 
 
Keywords: MANETs, AODV, Routing protocol, blackhole 
attack. 
1. Introduction 
Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is one of the recent 
active fields and has received spectacular consideration 
because of their self-configuration and self-maintenance. 
Early research assumed a friendly and cooperative 
environment of wireless network. As a result they focused 
on problems such as wireless channel access and multihop 
routing. But security has become a primary concern to 
provide protected communication between mobile nodes 
in a hostile environment. Although mobile ad hoc 
networks have several advantages over wired networks, on 
the other side they pose a number of non-trivial challenges 
to the security design as they are more vulnerable than 
wired networks [1]. These challenges include open 
network architecture, shared wireless medium, demanding 
resource constraints, and, highly dynamic network 
topology. In this paper, we have considered a fundamental 
security problem in MANET to protect its basic 
functionality to deliver data bits from one node to another. 
Nodes help each other in conveying information to and fro 
and thereby creating a virtual set of connections between 
each other. Routing protocols play an imperative role in 
the creation and maintenance of these connections. In 
contrast to wired networks, each node in an ad-hoc 
networks acts like a router and forwards packets to other 
peer nodes. The wireless channel is accessible to both 
legitimate network users and malicious attackers. As a 
result, there is a blurry boundary separating the inside 
network from the outside world.  
Many different types of routing protocols have been 
developed for ad hoc networks and have been classified 
into two main categories by Royer and Toh (1999) as 
Proactive (periodic) protocols and Reactive (on-demand) 
protocols. In a proactive routing protocol, nodes 
periodically exchange routing information with other 
nodes in an attempt to have each node always know a 
current route to all destinations [2]. In a reactive protocol, 
on the other hand, nodes exchange routing information 
only when needed, with a node attempting to discover a 
route to some destination only when it has a packet to send 
to that destination [3]. In addition, some ad hoc network 
routing protocols are hybrids of periodic and on-demand 
mechanisms. 
Wireless ad hoc networks are vulnerable to various 
attacks. These include passive eavesdropping, active 
interfering, impersonation, and denial-of-service. A single 
solution cannot resolve all the different types of attacks in 
ad hoc networks. In this paper, we have designed a novel 
method to detect blackhole attack: DPRAODV, which 
isolates that malicious node from the network. We have 
complemented the reactive system on every node on the 
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network. This agent stores the Destination sequence 
number of incoming route reply packets (RREPs) in the 
routing table and calculates the threshold value to evaluate 
the dynamic training data in every time interval as in [4]. 
Our solution makes the participating nodes realize that, 
one of their neighbors is malicious; the node thereafter is 
not allowed to participate in packet forwarding operation. 
In Section 2 of this paper, we summarize the basic 
operation of AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand distance Vector 
Routing) protocol on which we base our work. In Section 
3, we discuss related work. In Section 4, we describe the 
effect of blackhole attack in AODV. Section 5 presents the 
design of our protocol; DPRAODV that protects against 
blackhole attack. Section 6 discusses the performance 
evaluation based on simulation experiments. Finally, 
Section 7 presents conclusion and future work 
2. Theoretical background of AODV 
AODV is a reactive routing protocol; that do not lie on 
active paths neither maintain any routing information nor 
participate in any periodic routing table exchanges. 
Further, the nodes do not have to discover and maintain a 
route to another node until the two needs to communicate, 
unless former node is offering its services as an 
intermediate forwarding station to maintain connectivity 
between other nodes [3]. AODV has borrowed the concept 
of destination sequence number from DSDV [5], to 
maintain the most recent routing information between 
nodes. 
Whenever a source node needs to communicate with 
another node for which it has no routing information, 
Route Discovery process is initiated by broadcasting a 
Route Request (RREQ) packet to its neighbors. Each 
neighboring node either responds the RREQ by sending a 
Route Reply (RREP) back to the source node or 
rebroadcasts the RREQ to its own neighbors after 
increasing the hop_count field. If a node cannot respond 
by RREP, it keeps track of the routing information in order 
to implement the reverse path setup or forward path setup 
[6].  
     The destination sequence number specifies the 
freshness of a route to the destination before it can be 
accepted by the source node. Eventually, a RREQ will 
arrive to node that possesses a fresh route to the 
destination. If the intermediate node has a route entry for 
the desired destination, it determines whether the route is 
fresh by comparing the destination sequence number in its 
route table entry with the destination sequence number  in 
the RREQ received. The intermediate node can use its 
recorded route to respond to the RREQ by a RREP packet, 
only if, the RREQ’s sequence number for the destination is 
greater than the recorded by the intermediate node. 
Instead, the intermediate node rebroadcasts the RREQ 
packet. If a node receives more than one RREPs, it updates 
its routing information and propagates the RREP only if 
RREP contains either a greater destination sequence 
number than the previous RREP, or same destination 
sequence number with a smaller hop count. It restrains all 
other RREPs it receives. The source node starts the data 
transmission as soon as it receives the first RREP, and 
then later updates its routing information of better route to 
the destination node. Each route table entry contains the 
following information:  
 
• Destination  node 
• Next hop 
• number of hops 
•  Destination sequence number 
• Active neighbors for the route 
• Expiration timer for the route table entry 
 
The route discovery process is reinitiated to establish 
a new route to the destination node, if the source node 
moves in an active session. As the link is broken and node 
receives a notification, and Route Error (RERR) control 
packet is being sent to all the nodes that uses this broken 
link for further communication. And then, the source node 
restarts the discovery process.  
As the routing protocols typically assume that all nodes 
are cooperative in the coordination process, malicious 
attackers can easily disrupt network operations by 
violating protocol specification. This paper discusses about 
blackhole attack and provides routing security in AODV 
by purging the threat of blackhole attacks 
3. Related works in securing AODV 
There are basically two approaches to secure MANET: 
(1) Securing Ad hoc Routing and (2) Intrusion Detection 
[7]. 
3.1 Secure Routing 
The Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing 
protocol (SEAD) [8] employs the use of hash chains to 
authenticate hop counts and sequence numbers in DSDV. 
Another secure routing protocol, Ariadne[9] assumes the 
existence of a shared secret key between two nodes based 
on DSR (reactive) routing protocol. The Authenticated 
Routing for Ad hoc networks (ARAN) is a standalone 
protocol that uses cryptographic public-key certificates in 
order to achieve the security goals [10]. Security-Aware 
Ad hoc Routing (SAR) uses security attributes such as 
trust values and relationships [11].  
The computation overhead involved in the above 
mentioned protocols is awful and often suffer from 
scalability problems. As a preventive measure, the packets 
IJCSI International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 2, 2009 
ISSN (Online): 1694-0784 
ISSN (Printed): 1694-0814 
 
56
 
IJCSI
are carefully signed, but an attacker can simply drop the 
packet passing through it, therefore, secure routing cannot 
resist such internal attacks. So our solution provides a 
reactive scheme that triggers an action to protect the 
network from future attacks launched by this malicious 
node. 
3.2 Intrusion Detection System 
Zhang and Lee [12] present an intrusion detection 
technique for wireless ad hoc networks that uses 
cooperative statistical anomaly detection techniques. The 
use of anomaly based detection techniques results in too 
many number of false positives. Stamouli proposes 
architecture for Real-Time Intrusion Detection for Ad hoc 
Networks (RIDAN) [7]. The detection process relies on a 
state-based misuse detection system. Therefore, each node 
requires extra processing power and sensing capabilities.  
In [13], the method requires the intermediate node to 
send Route Confirmation Request (CREQ) to next hop 
towards the destination. This operation can increase the 
routing overhead resulting in performance degradation. In 
[14], source node verifies the authenticity of node that 
initiates RREP by finding more than one route to the 
destination, so that it can recognize the safe route to 
destination. This method can cause the routing delay, since 
a node has to wait for RREP packet to arrive from more 
than two nodes. In [4], the feature used is dest_seq_no, 
which reflects the trend of updating the threshold and 
hence reflecting the adaptively change in network 
environment.  
Therefore, a method that can prevent the attack without 
increasing routing overhead and delay is required. All the 
above mentioned approaches except [4], use static value 
for threshold. To resolve the problem, threshold value 
should be reflecting current network environment by 
updating its value. And also, our solution ensures that a 
node once detected as malicious cannot participate in 
forwarding and sending of a data packet in the network.  
4. Description of Blackhole attack 
MANETs are vulnerable to various attacks. General 
attack types are the threats against Physical, MAC, and 
network layer which are the most important layers that 
function for the routing mechanism of the ad hoc network.  
Attacks in the network layer have generally two purposes: 
not forwarding the packets or adding and changing some 
parameters of routing messages; such as sequence number 
and hop count. A basic attack that an adversary can 
execute is to stop forwarding the data packets. As a result, 
when the adversary is selected as a route, it denies the 
communication to take place. In blackhole attack, the 
malicious node waits for the neighbors to initiate a RREQ 
packet. As the node receives the RREQ packet, it will 
immediately send a false RREP packet with a modified 
higher sequence number.  So, that the source node assumes 
that node is having the fresh route towards the destination. 
The source node ignores the RREP packet received from 
other nodes and begins to send the data packets over 
malicious node. A malicious node takes all the routes 
towards itself. It does not allow forwarding any packet 
anywhere.  This attack is called a blackhole as it swallows 
all objects; data packets [15]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  Blackhole attacks in MANETs 
In figure 1, source node S wants to send data packets to 
a destination node D in the network. Node M is a 
malicious node which acts as a blackhole. The attacker 
replies with false reply RREP having higher modified 
sequence number. So, data communication initiates from S 
towards M instead of D. 
5. DPRAODV: Solution against blackhole 
attack  
In normal AODV, the node that receives the RREP 
packet first checks the value of sequence number in its 
routing table. The RREP packet is accepted if it has 
RREP_seq_no higher than the one in routing table. Our 
solution does an addition check to find whether the 
RREP_seq_no is higher than the threshold value. The 
threshold value is dynamically updated as in [4] in every 
time interval. As the value of RREP_seq_no is found to be 
higher than the threshold value, the node is suspected to be 
malicious and it adds the node to the black list. As the 
node detected an anomaly, it sends a new control packet, 
ALARM to its neighbors. The ALARM packet has the 
black list node as a parameter so that, the neighboring 
nodes know that RREP packet from the node is to be 
discarded. Further, if any node receives the RREP packet, 
it looks over the list, if the reply is from the blacklisted 
node; no processing is done for the same. It simply ignores 
the node and does not receive reply from that node again. 
So, in this way, the malicious node is isolated from the 
network by the ALARM packet. The continuous replies 
from the malicious node are blocked, which results in less 
Routing overhead. Moreover, unlike AODV, if the node is 
found to be malicious, the routing table for that node is not 
updated, nor the packet is forwarded to another node. 
                         
RREQ  
RREP      
Data     
D
S
MA
B
C
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The threshold value is dynamically updated using the 
data collected in the time interval. If the initial training 
data were used, then the system could not adapt the 
changing environment. The threshold value is the average 
of the difference of dest_seq_no in each time slot between 
the sequence number in the routing table and the RREP 
packet. The time interval to update the threshold value is 
as soon as a newer node receives a RREP packet. As a new 
node receives a RREP for the first time, it gets the updated 
value of the threshold. So our design not only detects the 
blackhole attack, but tries to prevent it further, by updating 
threshold which reflects the real changing environment. 
Other nodes are also updated about the malicious act by an 
ALARM packet, and they react to it by isolating the 
malicious node from network.  
6. Evaluation of DPRAODV 
6.1 Simulation Environment 
For simulation, we have used ns2 (v-2.33) network 
simulator [16]. Mobility scenarios are generated by using a 
Random waypoint model by varying 10 to 70 nodes 
moving in a terrain area of 800m x 800m. Each node 
independently repeats this behavior and mobility is varied 
by making each node stationary for a period of pause time. 
The simulation parameters are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Simulator Ns-2(ver.2.33) 
Simulation time 1000 s 
Number of nodes  70 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Traffic Model CBR 
Pause time 2 (s) 
Maximum mobility 60 m/s 
No. of sources 5 
Terrain area 800m x 800m 
Transmission Range 250m 
No. of malicious node 1 
 
 
A new Routing Agent is added in ns-2 to include the 
blackhole attack. In order to implement blackhole attack, 
the malicious node generates a random number between 
15 and 200, adds the number to the sequence number in 
RREQ and then generates the sequence number in RREP.  
In our simulation, the communication is started between 
source node to the destination node in presence of the 
malicious node. The node number of source node, 
destination node and malicious node are 2, 7 and 0 
respectively. 
 
6.2 Simulation Evaluation Methodology 
The simulation is done to analyze the performance of 
the network’s various parameters. The metrics used to 
evaluate the performance are given below: 
• Packet Delivery Ratio: The ratio of the data 
delivered to the destination to the data sent out by 
the source. 
• Average End-to-end delay: The difference in the 
time it takes for a sent packet to reach the 
destination. It includes all the delays, in the 
source and each intermediate host, caused by the 
routing discovery, queuing at the interface queue 
etc.  
• Normalized routing overhead: This is the ratio of 
routing-related transmissions (RREQ, RREP, 
RERR etc) to data transmissions in a simulation. 
A transmission is one node either sending or 
forwarding a packet. Either way, the routing load 
per unit data successfully delivered to the 
destination. 
6.2 Simulation Analysis and Results 
Various network contexts are considered to measure 
the performance of a protocol. These contexts are created 
by varying the following parameters in the simulation. 
• Network size: variation in the number of mobile 
nodes. 
• Traffic load: variation in the number of sources 
• Mobility: variation in the maximum speed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Impact of Mobility on the performance 
                                                            (a) 
                                         (b) 
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Figure 2a and 2b conclude the simulation based on the 
effect of mobility on the DPRAODV compared to normal 
AODV. The PDR stays within acceptable limits almost 4-
5% lower than it should normally be with minimum 
overhead. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Impact of Network Size on the performance 
All the above three contexts are simulated and tested to 
see the effect of network size on Packet Delivery Ratio( 
PDR), Average End-to end delay and Normalized Routing 
Overhead.  
From figure 3a and b, we analyze that, under blackhole 
attack, the PDR of DPRAODV is improved by 80-85% 
than AODV under attack with Average-End-to-end delay 
almost same as normal AODV.    
 
In Figure 3c, it is observed that there is slight increase 
in Normalized Routing Overhead, which is quite 
negligible. In AODV under attack, the delay will be less 
and routing overhead will be quite high compared to 
normal AODV, so our comparison is between normal 
AODV and DPRAODV. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Impact of Traffic Load on the performance 
From the figure 4, it is clear that as the traffic load 
increases, the PDR of DPRAODV increases by 
approximately 60% than AODV under attack. As our 
solution generates ALARM packet, there is slight increase 
in Normalized Routing Overhead with almost same Delay 
as normal AODV.      
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7. Conclusions 
In DPRAODV, we have used a very simple and 
effective way of providing security in AODV against 
blackhole attack. As from the graphs illustrated in results 
we can easily infer that the performance of the normal 
AODV drops under the presence of blackhole attack. Our 
prevention scheme detects the malicious nodes and isolates 
it from the active data forwarding and routing and reacts 
by sending ALARM packet to its neighbors. Our solution: 
DPRAODV increases PDR with minimum increase in 
Average-End-to-end Delay and normalized Routing 
Overhead.  
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